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ANNEX:  Development  of  the  financial  perspective  framework 
and  of  the  budget -1-
INTRODUCTION 
Point  19  of  the  Interinstitutional  Agreement  concluded  in  1988  requires 
the  Commission  to  present  a  report  before  the  end  of  1991  on  the 
application of  the  Agreement  and  on  the  amendments  which  need  to  be  made  in 
the  I lght  of  experience. 
The  Agreement  can  be  said so  far  to  have  produced  generally  positive 
results  In  attaining  the  declared objectives of  budgetary  discipline  and 
improving  the  budgetary  procedure.  The  Commission  proposes  that  the 
Agreement  be  renewed,  with  various  amendments  being made  to  take  account  of 
past  experience  and  to clarify certain  Implementing  rules. 
This  report  deals with  the  details of  the  Agreement  itself and  the  design 
of  the  financial  perspective  framework,  which  is  an  integral  part of  it. 
The  Commission  presents also a  communication entitled  "The  Community's 
Finances  Between  Now  and  1997"  concerning,  In  particular,  the  headings of 
the  financial  perspective  and  the  corresponding  financial  allocations.  In 
the  light  of  the outcome  of  the  discussions  the Commission will  produce  a 
proposal  for  the draft of  a  new  interinstitutional  agreement  comprising  the 
framework  for  the  financial  perspective  1993-1997. 
The  solutions  to  the  various  problems  arising must  accommodate  financial 
and  budgetary  imp I ications which  emerge  from  the  conclusions of  the 
Intergovernmental  Conferences on  Political  Union  and  Economic  and  Monetary 
Union.  There  must  also  be  continued  coherence  between  the  various 
components  of  the  package  of  decisions  taken  in  1988  with  the 
Interinstitutional  Agreement  as  the  centrepiece:  the  system of  own 
resources,  which  wil I  be  reviewed  at  the  same  time  as  the  Agreement,  and 
the  rules governing certain major  categories of expenditure,  in  particular 
the  Decision on  budgetary discipline and  the basic Regulation on  the 
structural  Funds. - 2  -
I.  APPLICATION  OF  THE  INTERINSTITUTIONAL  AGREEMENT:  EXPERIE;,!CE  TO  D:1.Y;: 
1.  Changes  In  the  financial  perspective  framework1 
I. 1  Revisions  or  amendments  of  the  Initial  financial  framework 
(a)  Apart  from  the  technical  adjustments  and  the  adjustments  to  take 
account  of  implementing  conditions,  the  financial  framework  laid  down 
in  1988  has  so  far  been  revised or  amended  four  times: 
The  first  two-stage  revision  in  December  1989  and  June  1990  was  to 
permit  implementation of  the  pol icy  of  cooperation with  Central 
and  Eastern  Europe,  step up  policies  towards  developing countries 
In  the Mediterranean area,  Asia  and  Latin America  and  strengthen 
Internal  pol lcies  in  connection with  the  application of  the 
Single Act.  Heading  5  was  adjusted  to accommodate  a  smoother 
growth  path  for  the margin  available  for  administrative 
expenditure  In  1991  and  1992. 
In  December  1990  the  three  institutions agreed  to amend  the 
financial  perspective  to take  account  of  the  financial  impact  of 
German  unification and  to  allow  financial  assistance  to be  entered 
in  the  budget  for  the countries most  affected  by  the Gulf  crisis. 
A readjustment  was  also made  between  headings  3  and  4  to 
accommodate  within  heading  4  a  new  instrument  for  the  environment 
(LIFE)  and  operations  in  1991  for  remote  regions with  fragile 
economies.  The  additional  requirements  resulting  from 
reassessment  of  repayments  to Spain  and  Portugal  were  included  in 
the  decision. 
The  financial  framework  was  again  adjusted  in  May  1991  to 
accommodate  the  Community's  measures  to  implement  a  number  of 
external  operations  (technical  assistance  to  the  USSR,  financial 
assistance  to  Israel  and  the occupied  territories,  aid  to  refugees 
of  Kurdish origin,  additional  food  aid  for  Africa). 
In  February  1992,  a  revision was  arranged  for  the  year  1992  in 
order  to enable:  the  follow-up  of  technical  assistance  to  the 
C.I.S;  a  supplementary  grant  for  the structural  funds  to 
compensate  for  the application  in  earlier  years of  inflation rates 
which  were  lower  than  those actually  suffered;  a  net 
reinforcement  of  actions  in  favour  of  tropical  forests  and  an 
adjustment  of  the  total  available  for  administrative expenditure; 
and  reimbursements  to certain Member  States.  Following  a 
reduction  in  the  ceiling of  the  heading  "Policies with  multiannual 
allocations"  and  of  the  1 ine  "Stock  disposal",  the  total  of 
commitment  and  payment  appropriations  remained  unchanged. 
The  changes  In  the  financial  perspective are  shown  in  the  Annex, 
together  with  the  development  of  the  budget  within  this  framework. - 3  -
(b)  The  revisions  and  amendments  have  raised  the overall  ceiling of  the 
financial  perspective  In  terms of  commitment  appropriations  by  a  total 
of  0.9%  in  1990,  by  5.7%  for  1991  and  by  4.3%  for  1992  compared  with 
the  amount  originally  laid down.  The  adjustments  mainly  affected 
heading  4  (Other  policies),  for  which  the  ceiling was  raised  by  18% 
for  1990,  83%  for  1991  and  65%  for  1992.  They  focused  on  external 
pol lcles,  which  account  for  65%  of  heading  4  in  1991  and  1992. 
However,  expenditure on  other  Internal  pol lcies  covered  by  this 
heading  grew  by  an  average of  18%  a  year  in  real  terms  from  1988 
to  1991. 
1.2  Margin  ava//ab/e  within  the  own  resources  ceiling 
By  reference  to  the  figures  and  forecasts  used  for  the  technical 
adjustment  of  the  financial  perspective  for  1992,  the  real  GNP  growth 
rate over  the  period  1988-92  averaged  2.7%  whereas  the  financial 
perspective  had  initially assumed  an  average  growth  rate of  2.3%.  In 
addition  the  GNP  level  was  reviewed  upwards  at  the start of  the  period 
and  then  rose  further  following  German  unification2  . 
Payment  appropriations  remained  for  the whole  period significantly 
below  the original  forecast,  expressed as  a  percentage of  GNP. 
Despite  the  revisions  and  adjustments made  to date  the margin 
avai fable  between  the  own  resources  cei I ing  and  the  total  payment 
appropriations  required  is sti II  0.06%  of  GNP  In  1991  and  0.05%  in 
1992. 
1.3  Development  of  the  budget  within  the  financial  perspective  framework 
As  only certain headings  had  to  have  their ceilings raised as  a  result 
of  the  revisions  and  adjustments,  and  as  a  margin  remained  avai fable 
under  the  cei I ing  of  heading  1  (EAGGF  Guarantee)  or  heading  5  (Stock 
disposal),  the  total  volume  of  payment  appropriations entered  in  the 
budget,  expressed  a~ a  percentage of  GNP,  was  below  the  cei I ing  set  in 
the  financial  perspective.  The  gap  was  0.12%  of  GNP  in  1990,  but  as 
of  1991  it  narrowed  and  the  budget  executed  at  a  level  which 
approached  the  ceiling of  the  financial  perspective.  Moreover,  the 
budget  adopted  for  1992,  following  amendment  by  the  draft  preliminary, 
supplementary  and  rectifying budget,  is set  at  the  cei I ing  of  the 
financial  perspective. 
2.  Objectives pursued 
2.1  Genera/  objectives 
The  general  objectives  pursued  when  the  Interinstitutional  Agreement  was 
concluded  fa I I  into  three  main  categories. 
(a)  The  Community  had  to  be  given  the  financial  resources  needed  to carry 
out  the  tasks  assigned  to  it  up  to  1992,  in  particular  implementation 
of  the  Single  European  Act. 
2  Taking  account  of  German  unification,  the  average  rate of  annual 
increase  is  3.1%  for  the  period,  1987-92. -II-
~i.a  ssm~  ~ime,  the  Agreemen~ nas  to serve  as  the  Instrument  for 
~.vlng  df~cc~  to  tha  cone  us!ons  of  the Brussels  European  Counci 1 on 
!:Jucigetc:;.,·y  c;rscipl !na.  An  overa! I  I !mit  was  set  on  the  increase  in 
tota;  Cowmunh:y  expenditure  over  this period  in  I ine  with  the  cei 1 ing 
of  o~n resources  granted  to  the  Community.  The  establ lshmant  of 
cell !ngs  for  broad  categories of  expenditure was  Intended  to  ensure 
orderly growth  In  the  structure of  expenditure  In  accordance  with  the 
priorities agreed  by  the  Institutions. 
In  particular,  a  fresh  balance  was  to  be  struck  between  agricultural 
expenditure,  the  growth  of  which  was  to  be  contained  by  the 
agricultural  guideline,  the  funds  allocated  to  research  and 
technological  development  pol icy,  the  financial  outlay on  the 
structural  operations designed  to achieve greater  coherence  and  the 
development  of  other  Internal  policies  In  connection with  the 
completion of  the  Internal  market. 
The  setting of  eel 1 lngs  by  heading  ensured  that  agricultural  spending 
was  contained;  spending  commitments  on  certain community  policies 
such  as  structural  funds,  research,  IMPs,  and  PEDIP  were  thereby 
guaranteed  to  be  carried out;  and  a  margin  for  manoeuvre  was  also 
maintained  for  other  policies within  the  I imits of  own  resources. 
(c)  The  establishment  of  this  financial  framework  was  intended  to  I imit 
the  risk of  future  conflict  between  the  two  arms  of  the  budgetary 
authority during  the  period of  application  and  to ensure  that  the 
annual  budgetary  procedures  ran  smoothly. 
The  development  of  new  policies not  provided  for  at  the outset  could 
not  be  covered  by  the  budget  unless  there was  a  prior  decision on  the 
political  objectives  to  be  aimed  at  and  an  assessment  of  the  financial 
imp I i cat ions. 
2.2  The  more  specific  concerns  of  the  Institutions  party  to  the  Agreement 
(a)  It  was  certainly  important  for  the  Council  to  be  able  to  rely on 
control led  development  of  Community  expenditure  under  which  new 
operations  introduced  could  be  identified and  their  financial 
implications evaluated within  the  limit  of  certain cei I ings. 
(b)  Parliament  was  given  a  guarantee  that  the  limits  imposed  on  the 
increase  in  compulsory expenditure- notably  on  agriculture- would 
leave  sufficient  funds  available  for  non-compulsory  expenditure  on 
structural  operations,  research  and  the  development  of  new  policies  in 
connection with  the  completion  of  the  internal  market. 
In  addition,  pursuant  to  the  Agreement  and  in  particular  when  the 
financial  perspective was  being  revised,  decisions with  a  major 
political  impact  had  to  be  taken outside  the  budgetary  procedure. 
This  substantially widened  the  scope of  joint  decision-making  between 
Pari lament  and  the Council. - 5  -
(c)  The  Commission  received  a  guarantee  that,  for  the  establishment  ~nd 
Implementation of  the  various  Community  policies,  the  financial 
aspects would  be  more  predictable and  the  budgetary  procedure  would  be 
less prone  to dispute.  Although  It  was  a  party  to  the  Agreement,  the 
Commission,  apart  from  making  the  annual  technical  adjustments,  has 
had  no  more  to  do  in  implementing  the  Agreement  than  proposing, 
subject  to certain  limits and  In  the event  of  unforeseen occurrences, 
a  revision of  the original  financial  framework. 
3.  Actual  Implementation of  the Agreement 
By  and  large,  the  1988  Agreement  has  achieved  its objectives.  This 
generally  favourable  judgment  must,  however,  be  tempered  by  two 
considerations:  the  favourable  circumstances surrounding application of 
the  Agreement,  and  the difficulties which  arose when  the  initial  financial 
framework  was  revised.  Furthermore,  the privileged status of  certain 
categories of  expenditure  has made  the  financial  framework  more  rigid  and 
raised  various  problems of  interpretation. 
3.1  Co•pl/ance  with  the  basic  principles  of  the  Agreement 
In  relation  to  the objectives of  improving  the budgetary procedure  and 
Imposing  budgetary discipline,  the operation of  the  Agreement  may  be 
considered generally satisfactory. 
(a)  For  each  of  the  financial  years  covered  by  the  Agreement,  the  budget 
has  been  adopted on  schedule. 
(b)  The  budgetary  discipline arrangements  introduced  in  1988  have  been 
accepted  by  the  various parties  to  the  Agreement. 
Every  budget  adopted since  the  Agreement  entered  into  force  has 
respecteD  the  ceilings set  by  the  financial  perspective.  On  a 
number  of occasions,  however,  the  completion of  the  procedure  for 
revising  the  financial  perspective  has  coincided with  the  end  of 
the  budgetary  procedure,  thereby detracting  from  the  medium-term 
framework  role which  the  instrument  was  intended  to  perform. 
The  classification of  individual  budget  items  by  heading  of  the 
financial  perspective as originally determined on  the  basis of  the 
1988  budget  has  not  changed,  except  for  the  transfer of  certain 
appropriations  from  Part  A of  the  budget  (heading  5  of  the 
financial  perspective)  to  Part  8  (heading  4)  during  the  1991 
budgetary  procedure. 
The  financial  framework  has  also  been  respected  in  the  uti I ization 
of  appropriations,  with  the  sole  exception of  food  aid,  for  which 
the  budgetary  authority agreed,  in  a  revision of  the  financial 
perspective,  to  allow  transfers  between  headings  1  and  4.  This 
"pipeline"  arrangement  could  be  enshrined  in  the  new  Agreement. - 6  -
~~though the  f!nanclai  perspsct!ve  has  been  revised  frequently-
mair~ly because  of  the  accumulation of  exceptional  events over  a 
short period- revision  has  always  taken  the  form  prescribed  in 
the  Agreement  (point  12  or  point  4). 
(c)  The  framework  Imposed  by  the  financial  perspective  has  had  the  effect 
of  better  positioning budgetary  choices  In  the  broader  context  of  the 
Community's  finances  In  the medium  term.  This  has certainly been  the 
effect on  the  Commission  In  its preparation of  the  preliminary  draft 
budget.  The  constraints of  fixed  cei I ings  have  probably  resulted  in  a 
more  rational  approach  to  the  preparation of  the  budget. 
3.2  Favourable  circumstances 
(a)  During  the  first  three  years  In  which  the  Agreement  was  applied,  the 
volume  of  agricultural  expenditure  remained more  or  less  constant  and 
well  below  the  I lmlt  fixed  by  the guideline.  This situation  is due 
less to a  deep-seated  reform of  the structural  conditions of  the 
Community  agricultural  markets  than  to  favourable  conditions on  the 
world  market  (world  prices and  ecu/dol lar  parity).  The  additional 
costs  In  agriculture  resulting  from  German  unification were  covered 
without  the existing ceiling having  to be  raised. 
However,  the  tide  began  to  turn  in  1990  and  the  budgetary  impact  has 
become  apparent  in  1991.  Moreover,  the  budget  adopted  for  1992  fixed 
spending on  agriculture at  the  ceiling set  by  the  agricultural 
guideline. 
(b)  Real  GNP  was  higher  than  initially assumed.  The  margin  actually 
available between  the  own  resources eel ling  and  the  total  payment 
appropriations  required according  to  the  financial  perspective was 
therefore  far  bigger  than  at  first expected.  If  this  had  not  been  the 
case,  the  Increases  In  the ceilings  for  the  various categories of 
expenditure would  have  pushed  the  total  up  against  the own  resources 
ceiling  from  1991.  If  the  rate of  economic  growth  had  been  lower  than 
the  rate originally  assumed,  the  technical  adjustments  to  the 
financial  perspective  in  I ine  with  inflation and  the  adjustments  to 
take  account  of  implementing  conditions  would  have  eaten  into  the 
margin  for  unforeseen  expenditure.  If  the margin  had  been  used  up,  it 
would  have  been  necessary  to agree on  criteria  for  reducing  the 
cell ings of  the  various  headings  in  order  to  respect  the  I imlt  on  own 
resources. 
(c)  Even  though  the  probability was  extremely slight,  the  Community  did 
not  have  to  cover  any  major  default  by  its debtors  under  its borrowing 
and  lending operations or  loan  guarantees. 
The  lending operations guaranteed  by  the  Community  total led 
ECU  11.5 billion and  annual  repayments  of  capital  and  interest  for  the 
years  ahead  come  to around  ECU  2.5 billion.  However,  since  these ----------·--------------------
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guarantees are only  given a  token entry  In  the  budget,  they  are  not 
taken  Into consideration  in  the  cei I ings set  by  the  financial 
perspective.  The  risk of default  by  a  debtor  is  increasing with  the 
extension of  this  type  of operation  to non-member  countries.  Unless  a 
suitable mechanism  is available,  the activation of  the guarantees 
above  a  certain amount  would  entail  either  a  revision of  the  financial 
perspective- which  experience  shows  to  be  a  lengthy  procedure- or  a 
drastic  reduction  in other  items  of  expenditure. 
The  favourable  circumstances which  have  accompanied  the  application of  the 
Agreement  certainly restrict  the  range of  experience gained  and  the  lessons 
which  may  be  drawn  for  the  future.  However,  the  Commission  does  not  feel 
that  this  is a  reason  for  doubting  whether  this  instrument  could operate 
effectively  in  different  circumstances.  On  the  contrary,  this shows  the 
importance of  giving  due  consideration  to various  situations which  could 
occur  and  of  taking  the  necessary measures  to  respond  to  them  when  the 
Agreement  is  renewed. 
3.3  Difficulties  encountered  during  the  revision  of  the  financial 
perspective 
The  revisions made  have  revealed several  types of  problem: 
(a)  At  the  time of  the  first  revision exercise  in  1990,  the  question  was 
raised about  the  kind of  reasons  which  could  Justify  the  revision  in 
application of  point  12  of  the  Agreement.  One  of  the  interpretations 
put  forward  was  that  a  revision  (under  qualified majority voting of 
the  Counci I)  was  only  possible  to enable  the  financing  of  new  actions 
made  necessary  by  unforeseen  circumstances.  Such  an  interpretation, 
if  it  had  prevailed,  would  have  meant  that  any  reinforcement  of 
existing policies and  alI  commitments  for  new  actions  not  linked  to 
unforeseen circumstances  (with  the  difficulty of defining  the  notion 
of  the  unforeseen)  is  in  fact  subordinated,  for  its financial 
implementation,  to  a  decision  taken  under  unanimous  voting  even  in  the 
areas  where  majority  voting  is  the  rule.  The  Commission's  position  is 
thus  that  the  possibi 1 ity of  proceeding  to a  revision  should  not  be 
I imited  a  priori  to particular  circumstances  and  that  revision  should 
take  place  by  qualified majority  decision  of  the  Counci I. 
(b)  The  revision  (under  point  12)  and  amendment  {under  point  4)  procedures 
have  in  each  instance  proved  to  be  difficult  and  lengthy  (three months 
on  average)  quite apart  from  the  time  required  to  implement  these 
changes  in  the  budgetary  procedure  itself.  As  a  result,  there  is  a 
risk  that  the  Community's  capacity  for  initiative might  lose  some 
credibi I ity. 
(c)  The  inability  to  respond  quickly  to unforeseen  events without  going 
through  the  revision  procedure,  even  where  the  effects on  the  budget 
are  I imited  to  a  single  financial  year,  tends  paradoxically  to 
undermine  the  medium-term  framework  role originally assigned  to  the 
financial  perspective.  There  is  a  danger  that  revision might  become  a 
normal  stage  in  every  budgetary  procedure. 
(d)  This  situation,  coupled  with  the  length of  the  procedure  for  revising 
or  amending  the  financial  perspective,  tends  to  merge  revision  and 
budgetary  procedures  Into a  single negotiation.  Each  institution 
tends  to  look  for  bargaining - 8  -
counters  in one  of  the  procedures  in  order  to secure  an  advantage  in 
the  negotiations on  the other  procedure,  resulting  in  a  stalemate or, 
at  the  very  least,  a  lack of  clarity and  rationality  in  the  debate. 
(e)  In  heading  4  (Other  policies).  the  budgetary authority- and  above  all 
the  Councl I  - has  generally  sought  to  ensure  not  only  that  the 
additional  requirements  catered  for  by  the  revision  are  defined  in 
detal I  In  terms of  the operations  concerned  but  also  that  the 
corresponding  allocations continue  to  be  distinguished  from  other 
expenditure  in  the  heading  when  the  budget  is  drawn  up  for  subsequent 
years.  When  this  Identification and  prior allocation of  expenditure 
proved difficult  to achieve  to any  degree of  detail,  although  the 
probability  that  It  would  be  incurred  was  high,  the  budgetary 
authority  has  preferred  to  1 lmlt  the  revision  to  the  current  financial 
year,  and  then  If  necessary make  successive  revisions  in  subsequent 
years. 
This understandable  concern  can  be  explained by  the  heterogeneous 
nature of  heading  4,  which  covers  both  the Community's  external 
actions and  a  wide  range of  internal  policies.  The  Commission 
therefore  proposed dividing  heading  4  into  internal  policies and 
external  policies.  Having  failed  to secure  the  agreement  of  the other 
institutions,  it therefore considered  it  logical  in  the  revision 
exercises  that  any  additional  allocations  for  external  policies should 
be  identified and  earmarked  for  this purpose. 
However,  apart  from  this consideration,  the  Commission  feels  that 
systematically allocating  in  advance  the  amount  provided  by  the 
revision of  an  individual  eel ling would  be  inconsistent  with  the 
object  of  the  financial  perspective.  This  approach  could  lead  to  a 
growing  fragmentation  during  the  period of  application of  the 
financial  framework  and  to more  rigidity  in  budgetary  management.  It 
lends  credit  to  the  idea  that  any  additional  amount  resulting  from 
revision must  be  entered  in  the  budget;  this  is  not  consistent  with 
the  idea  of  a  ceiling.  Since  new  requirements  are  not  considered  as 
being  pooled  together  with  the other  expenditure  covered  by  the 
heading,  it  is more  difficult  to examine  the possibility of 
redeploying  the  appropriations. 
(f)  On  a  number  of  occasions,  the  changes  which  had  to  be  made  to  the 
financial  perspective were  the  result of  political  decisions  taken  by 
the  Council  in  matters of  external  relations.  During  the  revision 
procedure,  Pari lament  thus  had  very  I ittle margin of  manoeuvre  to 
discuss  the  principle and  the  financial  implications of  these 
decisions.  A more  general  revision,  with  use  of  the  additional  margin 
being  decided  jointly on  a  case-by-case  basis,  would  have  produced  a 
more  even distribution of  decision-making  powers  in  applying  the 
Agreement. 
The  last  revision of  the  financial  perspective,  which  was  only  brought 
to  a  close  In  February  1992  after  a  particularly  long  procedure, 
suffered  from  an  accumulation of  most  of  these  problems.  This 
experience serves  to under I ine  more  than  ever  the  need  for  the 
introduction of  more  flexible  arrangements  into  the  new  agreement,  to 
confront  In  an  effective way  unforeseen  circumstances,  without  cal I ing 
Into question  the  rlgour  of  budgetary discipline. - 9  -
3.4.  The  effects  of  the  privileged  status  accorded  to  certain  categories  of 
expenditure 
Legislative decisions  taken  In  1988  fixed  allocations  for  certain 
categories of operations  In  terms of  expenditure objectives. 
As  a  result,  the  two  arms  of  the  budgetary  authority undertook- in 
point  17  of  the  Interinstitutional  Agreement- to  respect  the  allocations 
of  commitment  appropriations  provided  In  the  financial  perspective  for  the 
structural  Funds,  PEDIP,  the  IMPs  and  the  RTD  framework  programme.  In  this 
context,  the  Commission  proposed  that  unused  budget  allocations  for  these 
programmes  be  transferred to  subsequent  years  and  the  transfers were  duly 
authorized  by  the  budgetary authority under  point  11  of  the  Agreement. 
These  transfers  reduce  the  margin  available under  the  own  resources 
cei I ing,  which  may  be  needed  to cover  new  requirements  in  the  year  in 
question.  If  growth  is  lower  than expected  Initially,  incomplete 
implementation  of  programmes  with multiannual  allocations  could,  as  a 
result of  transfers,  jeopardize  the  agreed  development  of  other  policies. 
For  these  categories of  expenditure,  the  financial  perspective ceases  to  be 
a  medium-term  framework.  Not  just  the  expenditure  concerned,  but  also  the 
cei I ing  of  the  heading  in  the  financial  perspective  which  includes  these 
categories,  tends  to  be  regarded  as  being  privileged.  By  extension,  the 
heading  4  ceiling has  come  to be  regarded  as  an  objective,  especially as 
the  subcei I ing  for  non-compulsory  expenditure under  this heading  was  one  of 
the  only  areas  in  which  Pari lament  had  any  real  margin of  decision. 
3.5.  Problems  of  Interpretation 
The  institutions have  differing views  on  the  extent  of  possible  revisions 
of  the  financial  perspective  under  point  12  of  the  Agreement.  The  Counci I 
feels  that  the  margin  for  unforeseen  expenditure  of  0.03%  of  GNP  referred 
to  in  point  12  is gradually used  up  by  successive  revisions.  In  any  case, 
a  revision which  is  limited  to a  modification of  cei I ings  by  heading, 
without  affecting  the overal I  ceiling of  the  financial  perspective,  remains 
possible.  On  the  other  hand,  Parliament  and  the  Commission  take  the  view 
that  the  margin  for  unforeseen expenditure  can  be  reconstituted within  the 
I imit  of  the  cei I ing  on  own  resources.  This  difference  in  interpretation 
has  only  been  overcome  by  using  point  4  (requiring  a  unanimous  decision of 
the  Counci I)  as  an  alternative basis  for  revisions or  by  omitting  any 
reference  to specific provisions of  the  Agreement  in  the  revision  decision. 
As  regards  the  technical  adjustments  to  the  financial  perspective  under 
point  9  of  the  Agreement,  the  Commission  has  adopted  the  following  method: 
the  cei I ings  for  year  n  are adjusted  in  February  of  year  n-1  on  the 
basis of  the  forecast  rate of  inflation  for  the  two  years  concerned 
and  the  actual  rate of  inflation  in  previous  years.  The  calculation -·-------------··------------·------------
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Is  therefore  based  on  the  latest  figures  and  forecasts  available; 
only  the  agricultural  guideline  is  adjusted  to  the  growth  of  GNP-
this  is  done  by  the method  of  calculation set  out  in  Article  6  of  •he 
Decision on  budgetary discipl Ina. 
This  method  of  adjustment  has  not  met  with  any  formal  opposition  by  the 
other  institutions but  has  come  in  for  some  criticism. 
It  has  been  argued  that  the  ceilings of  alI  the  headings  should  be 
adjusted  in  line with  real  GNP  growth,  which  would  mean  in  practice 
that  the  ceilings were  considered  to  have  been  set  as  a  percentage of 
GNP  and  not  as  an  absolute  figure. 
Pari lament  and  some  Member  States believe  that  there  should  be  an 
ex  post  adjustment  to  take  into account  any  divergence  between  the 
rate of  inflation used  ahead of  the  budgetary  procedure  and  the  actual 
rates measured  later.  This  subsequent  correction  is  held  to be 
particularly necessary  for  allocations  to  the  structural  Funds  to 
ensure  that  their  resources  show  a  linear  progression  in  real  terms. 
The  Commission  considers  that  this ex  post  correction cannot  be  made  as 
part of  the  technical  adjustment  under  point  9  of  the  Agreement.  It  takes 
the  view  that  the  correction relates only  to  the  allocation  for  the 
structural  Funds  in  connection with  the  doubling of  appropriations  planned 
between  1987  and  1993.  This  question  should  be  dealt  with  either  during 
the  revision or,  at  al 1 events,  at  the  end  of  the  procedure. 
It  takes  the  view  that  in  future  no  ex  post  adjustment  should  be  allowed. 
On  a  number  of  occasions  the  Commission  has  pointed out  that  the  breakdown 
of  the overal I  cei I ings  for  commitment  and  payment  appropriations  into 
compulsory  and  non-compulsory  expenditure  is  purely  indicative  and  can  be 
adjusted  by  the  budget  decisions  provided  that  the  cei I ings  for  each 
heading  are  respected.  Any  other  interpretation would  make  the  financial 
perspective  too  restrictive. - 1f  -
I ! .  GI.H DEU NES  FOR  THE  RENEWAL  OF  THE  ! NTEIH NSTI TUT IONAL  AGREEMENT 
1.  Features  to be  retained 
1. 1.  The  objectives assigned  to  the  Interinstitutional  Agreement  in  1988 
are sti I I  val ld.  The  Commission  bel laves  that  the  Agreement  should  be 
renewed  and  that  its  three  guiding  principles  should  be  retained: 
(a)  A financial  framework  for  the  medium  term  is  agreed on  by  the  three 
institutions,  setting annual  eel lings  for  broad categories of 
Community  expenditure. 
(b)  The  content  and  eel ling of  each  heading  are determined on  the  basis of 
priorities adopted  by  the  Community  in  order  to ensure  the orderly 
progression of  expenditure. 
(c)  Each  year  the overall  expenditure ceiling remains  within  the  I imits of 
the  Community's  own  resources. 
1.2  Setting  the  ceilings 
(a)  The  eel I ing  for  the  various  headings  (In  commitment  appropriations) 
and  the overall  ceiling of  the  financial  perspective  (in commitment 
appropriations  and  in  payment  appropriations)  should  continue  to  be 
set  In  constant  ecus. 
The  establishment  of  a  financial  framework  in  absolute  figures  and 
not,  for  example,  as  a  proportion of  GNP  is  in  fact  more  consistent 
with  the  logic  of  budgetary discipline.  The  maximum  level  of 
Community  expenditure,  its structure and  its growth  profile depend 
primarily on  requirements,  bearing  in  mind  the  responsibi I ities 
assigned  to  the  Community,  and  not  directly  on  the  growth  in  Community 
prosperity. 
The  establishment  of  the  financial  framework  in  current  ecus  would 
have  to  be  based on  an  inflation  forecast  for  the  whole  of  the  period. 
An  explicit  forecast  of  this  type  over  such  a  long  term  would 
inevitably  be  very  uncertain  and  adjustments  during  the  period of 
application would  be  hard  to  avoid. 
(b)  As  regards  EAGGF  Guarantee  expenditure  (heading  1),  in  view  of  the 
amounts  involved,  the  retention of  a  I imit  on  the  increase  in 
agricultural  spending  is  a  basic  factor  in  budgetary  discipline  and  an 
essential  precondition  for  the  political  balance  to  be  achieved 
between  the  Member  States  and  between  the  institutions  in  the 
establishment  of  a  new  financial  framework. - 12  -
The  Com;nission  therefore  proposes  that  the  principle of  the 
agricultural  guideline  laid  down  in  the  Decision  on  budgetary 
discipl lne  should  be  maintained. 
(c)  As  at  present,  the  eel I ing  on  the  payment  appropriations  required 
should  be  set  for  the  total  of  the  financial  perspective,  on  the  basis 
of  a  relationship with  total  commitment  appropriations  for  each  major 
category of  expenditure  determined  In  such  a  way  as  to  ensure  an 
orderly  development  of  the  balance  of  outstanding  commitments. 
(d)  UnlIke  the  expenditure cei I ings,  the  own  resources ceiling  has  to  be 
set as  a  percentage of  GNP.  While  the  level  of· expenditure  is 
determined  by  the  nature  and  volume  of  budgetary operations considered 
necessary,  the  level  of  revenue  corresponds  to  an  "ability  to  pay", 
which  depends  mainly  on  economic activity. 
The  level  of  the  cell ings  must  be  set  In  the  financial  perspective  in 
such  a  way  that  a  margin  is  left  between  the  own  resources  cei I ing  and 
the  total  payment  appropriations  required.  Changes  in  the  level  of 
own  resources available  in  line with  actual  GNP  growth  would  be  added 
to or  subtracted  from  this margin,  which  would  determine  the  extent  of 
possible  revisions of  expenditure cei I ings  each  year.  It  would  also 
be  worth  specifying  in  the  Agreement  that,  if  there was  a  risk  that 
this safety margin  would  be  exhausted  as  a  result of  a  downturn  in 
economic  activity,  the  Commission  would  examine,  with  the other 
insitutions concerned,  the  changes  made  necessary  to  the  financial 
framework  and  would  present  proposals  as  appropriate. 
(e)  The  Commission  would  continue  to make  an  annual  technical  adjustment 
before  the  budgetary  procedure  begins.  However,  it  should  be  made 
quite clear  that 
the  adjustment  in  I ine  with  real  GNP  growth  is  applied  only  for 
determining  the  agricultural  guide! ine,  in  accordance  with  the  method 
of  calculation prescribed elsewhere,  and  the  actual  amount  of  the 
cei I lng  on  avai !able  own  resources; 
the  cei I ings  of  the  various  headings  (except  for  the  agricultural 
monetary  reserve)  are  adjusted  in  I ine  with  price  increases  for  the 
year  of  the  pre! iminary  draft  budget  on  the  basis of  the  rates of 
inflation  avai !able at  the  time  and  cannot  be  corrected subsequently. ~~---~~------~~ --------------
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This  approach  Is  the only one  consistent  with  the nature of  the  budget, 
which  Is  an  act  of  authorization based  on  forecasts. 
2.  Creation of  a  reserve  for  exceptional  or  unforeseen expenditure 
A specific  heading  should  be  reserved  for  expenditure of  a  non-permanent 
nature  which  may  be  Incurred  In  particular  circumstances  and  subject  to 
compl lance  with certain pre-established criteria. 
Apart  from  the existing monetary  reserve,  two  other  categories of 
expenditure of  this  type may  be  envisaged: 
a  reserve  for  unforeseen expenditure  in  the  field of  external  actions 
by  means  of crisis situations such  as urgent  humanitarian aid or 
financial  assistance  to a  particular  third country  can  be  met  for  a 
financial  year  without  having  to  revise  the  financial  perspective; 
a  reserve  to guarantee  borrowing  and  lending operations with 
non-member  countries so  that  the  appropriations  required could  be 
entered  in  the  budget  should  the  Community  guarantee  need  to be 
activated. 
2.1  Creation  of  a  reserve  for  unforeseen  expenditure  In  the  field  of 
external  actions 
(a)  Purpose  of  the  reserve 
The  aim  would  be  to enable  the Community  budget  to be  adjusted quickly,  for 
one  year,  to cater  for  exceptional  or  unforeseen  circumstances,  without  the 
need  for  a  revision of  the  financial  perspective.  The  revision  procedure 
should  be  reserved  for  cases where  changes  need  to  be  made  in  the  planned 
development  or  structure of  Community  expenditure during  the  application of 
the  Agreement  and  extending  beyond  the  current  financial  year. 
The  reserve  would  be  drawn  upon,  within  the  I imits of  the  amount  fixed,  to 
allow  the  cei I ing  of  a  particular  heading  to be  exceeded  for  one  year.  For 
a  given  financial  year  the  reserve  would  be  available only  in  the  time 
between  the  presentation of  the  preliminary  draft  budget  and  the  end  of  the 
financial  year.  It  would  only  be  drawn  on  to  cover  emergency  humanitarian 
aid or  financial  assistance  to non-member  countries  in  case of crisis. 
(b)  Dovetai I ing  with  the  budget 
The  reserve  would  be  drawn  on  following  a  Commission  proposal  after  the 
possibi I ities of  financing  the  additional  requirements  by  redeploying - 14  -
expenditure  within  the  heading  have  been  fully  examined;  it  might  even  be 
possible  to  agree  on  a  rule prescribing  the  minimum  amount  of  redeployment 
(a  kind of  "excess"). 
In  order  that  recourse  to  the  reserve  does  not  upset  the  balance  of  the 
financial  framework  agreed  between  the  institutions,  cal Is  on  the  reserve 
would  be  agreed  jointly  by  the  two  arms  of  the  budgetary  authority. 
Budgetary  cover  would,  as  a  rule,  be  provided  by  the  normal  procedures: 
if  the  reserve  were  mobi  I ized  between  the  date  when  the  preliminary 
draft  was  presented  and  the  beginning of  the  financial  year,  a  letter 
of  amendment  would  have  to  be  drawn  up  for  the  proposed  additional 
appropriations  in  excess of  the  ceiling  for  the  heading  concerned. 
if  the  reserve  were  mobi  I ized  during  the  execution of  the  budget, 
there would  be  two  possible courses of  action: 
* 
* 
consideration would  be  given  to  the  possibility of  transferring 
appropriations within  the  budget  as  adopted,  depending  on  the 
stage  reached  in  the  financial  year  and  the  present  and 
foreseeable  conditions of  implementation; 
otherwise  budget  cover  for  the operation concerned would  have  to 
be  provided  by  a  supplementary  and  amending  budget. 
In  cases where  speed  is of  the  essence,  provision  should  be  made  so  that  a 
decision  can  be  taken,  for  example  in  a  trialogue  and  on  a  majority  vote, 
to adopt  the  necessary  supplementary  and  amending  budget  by  expedited 
procedure  (a single reading  and  shortened  timetable of  no  more  than  one 
month). 
2.2  Guarantee  for  borrowing  and  lending  operations 
(a)  As  lending operations  in  non-Community  countries  have  increased, 
Pari iament  has  repeatedly  demanded  the  establishment  of  a  reserve  for 
the  guarantees  I inked  to  these  instruments.  The  Commission  is  also 
aware  that  loans  to  non-Community  countries  now  represent  very 
significant  amounts  and  considers  that  it  would  be  useful  to  have  a 
mechanism  which  would,  if  necessary  allow  the  Community  guarantee  to 
be  activated  in  total  clarity;  it made  a  statement  to  this effect 
when  the  decision  was  taken  to extend  EIB  loans  to  a  number  of 
countries  in  Central  and  Eastern  Europe.  It  also stated on  this 
occasion  that  it  would  be  presenting  a  proposal  to  this effect  when 
the  Interinstitutional  Agreement  was  renewed.  The  Counci I  shared  the 
Commission's  concern  and  stated  that  it  would  examine  these  proposals 
when  they  were  presented. 
(b)  The  Commission  considers  that  the  mechanism  to  be  introduced  under  the 
new  financial  framework  should  be  designed  to  provide  rapid  budgetary 
cover  for  any  activation of  the  guarantee,  which  would  be  charged 
initially  to  cash  resources,  in  accordance with  Article  12  of 
Regulation  No  1552/89 on  the  application of  the  own  resources  system. - 15  -
As  the  Community  continues  to  back  all  its guarantees with  the  entire 
budget,  the size of  the  reserve  would  not  automatical IY  I imit  the 
volume  of  loans or  guarantees  that  could  be  granted. 
(c)  For  the mobil lsatlon of  this reserve,  a  mechanism  Inspired  by  the 
Monetary  reserve  could  be  envisaged.  The  reserve  would  be  included 
each  year  In  the  budget:  the  Implementation of  the  guarantee  would 
operate  through  a  transfer  from  this  reserve  to  the  budget  I ine 
concerned  (with  a  token  entry  (p.m.)).  In  this case,  the  amount  of 
the  reserve  for  guarantees would  have  to  be  distinguished  from  the 
contingency  reserve  proposed  above,  each  having  its own  sub-heading. 
Another  formula,  more  flexible,  would  be  to only  budgetise  if  the 
reserve  is used,  for  the  necessary  amount  and  by  way  of  a 
supplementary  and  amending  budget.  In  this case  the  two  types of 
reserve  could  stay combined  under  one  heading.  However,  the 
Commission,  as  part  of  the yearly  technical  adjustment  exercise,  would 
determine  what  proportion of  that  reserve should  be  allocated  to  the 
guaranteeing of  borrowing  and  lending operations.  The  proportion would 
be  set at  a  predetermined percentage  (20%  for  example)  of  the  payments 
in  interest  and  capital  on  such  operations falling  due  in  the 
following  financial  year. 
(d)  If,  on  the other  hand,  it  was  decided  to set  up  a  Guarantee  Fund  for 
external  loans outside  the  budget,  the  reserve  entered  in  the 
financial  perspective would  be  drawn  on  during  the  year  to  provide  the 
Fund  with  amounts  corresponding  to  the  newly  granted  loans. 
3.  Revision of  the  financial  perspective 
3. 1.  Joint  decision  by  the  three  Institutions 
Since  the  Agreement  is  between  the  three  institutions,  it would  be  logical 
for  all  three  (i.e.  the  Commission  included)  to  decide  jointly on  revisions 
of  the  financial  perspective.  The  majority  voting  rule would  app!y  to  any 
rev1s1on of  expenditure  cei I ings  (overall  or  for  individual  headi~gs), 
provided  that  the  I imits  on  own  resources  are  respected. 
The  revision  decision  would  have  to  be  taken  within  a  given  time  I imit  (two 
months,  say).  A trialogue meeting  would  be  arranged  in  the  month  following 
the Commission's  proposal.  If  no  decision could  be  agreed within  the  time 
I imit,  the  Commission's  proposal  would  be  deemed  to  be  rejected. " 
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.l.  · .r11n  available  for  revision 
1~  should  be  made  clear  that  the  margin  aval !able  for  one or  more  revisions 
for  each  year  covered  by  the  financial  perspective  is  the  difference 
between: 
the  avera! I  eel I lng  for  payment  appropriations  as originally set  by 
the  financial  perspective  and  after  annual  adjustments,  and 
the  own  resources  eel I ing. 
3.3  Conditions  and  frequency  of  revision 
It  should  be  possible  to  initiate a  revision  procedure  not  only  to  deal 
with  unforeseen  circumstances- a  situation which,  initially and  up  to  a 
certain amount,  could  be  covered  by  the  reserve set  up  for  this purpose-
but  also  to  implement  the  Community's  pol icy  decisions  involving  new 
operations or  a  resetting of  priorities. 
Any  revision of  the  financial  perspective  should  therefore  take  place 
before  the  beginning of  the  budgetary  procedure  for  the  financial  year 
concerned.  It  could  be  stated  in  the  Agreement  that,  before  the  budgetary 
procedure  begins,  the  Commission  must  indicate  whether  it  proposes  to 
maintain or  revise  the existing  financial  perspective. 
3.4.  Rules  on  redeployment 
So  that  decisions on  new  budget  expenditure  wi  I I  not,  where  possible,  cause 
the  overal I  cell lngs of  the  financial  perspective  to  be  raised up  to  the 
limit  of  available own  resources,  the  institutions should  undertake  to 
abide  by  certain rules: 
as  with  the  decision  to  draw  on  the  reserve  for  exceptional  or 
unforeseen expenditure,  a  decision  to raise  the  cei I ing of  a 
particular  heading  should  be  taken only  after  the possibilities of 
financing  the  additional  requirements  by  redeploying  expenditure 
within  the  heading  have  been  fully  examined;  it might  even  be 
possible  to  agree  on  a  rule  prescribing  the  minimum  amount  of 
redeployment; 
the  possibi I ity of  lowering  the  cei I ing  of  one  heading  to offset  the 
raising of  the  eel I ing  of  another  should  be  investigated wherever  it 
seems  both  possible  and  desirable  to establish  a  new  and  lasting 
balance  between  the  headings  concerned; 
on  a  more  permanent  basis,  the  institutions should  ensure  that  safety 
margins  are  preserved  below  the ceilings of  the  various  headings  when 
the  budget  is  being  established  and  adopted. -------~----------------~----- ---··-----~----~--~----------~-----
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4.  The  privileged status of certain categories of  expenditure  and 
adjustments  In  line with  the conditions of  implementation 
If  the  allocations  for  certain operations and  instruments  (In particular 
the  Structural  Funds  and  the  Cohesion  Fund)  are  to continue  to  be  treated 
as  expenditure objectives  in  the  basic  legal  Instruments,  provisions 
similar  to point  17 of  the  Agreement  would  have  to be  retained.  The 
privileged status given  to certain categories should,  however,  remain  the 
exception,  since  the  rule  Is  that  the ceilings are  upper  limits which  must 
not  be  exceeded  and  that  the  actual  budget  allocations should  normally  come 
within  these  I imits. 
Even  if  some  categories of  expenditure are  fixed  as objectives,  the 
institutions should  not  necessarily  be  obliged  to transfer  to  later  years 
appropriations  earmarked  for  these operations which  remain  unused  during  a 
given  financial  year.  Point  11  of  the  Agreement  might  therefore  be 
dropped,  since  in practice  it may  compromise  the  implementation of  other 
expenditure within  the ceiling of  the  financial  perspective. 
5.  Duration and  renewal  of  the Agreement 
The  Interinstitutional  Agreement  could  be  concluded  for  indefinite 
duration,  the  unanimous  agreement  of  the  three  institutions being  required 
for  any  changes  to  the  rules. 
The  financial  perspective  framework,  on  the other  hand,  would  be 
established  for  five  years  (1993-97). 
The  definition of  the  financial  perspective by  a  more  continuous  process 
would  guarantee  that  when  it expires  there  is  already  a  further  reference 
framework  for  assessing  the  future  implications of  newly  introduced 
measures.  However,  a  "rolling-plan"  financial  perspective would  cease  to 
be  a  framework  fo1  medium-term  political  choices  and  commitments.  If  the 
financial  perspective were  extended each  year  by  the  addition of  an  extra 
final  year,  this would  either give  rise  to difficult discussions or  become 
a  mechanical  exercise  In  projection which  would  be  contrary  to  the  nature 
of  the  financial  perspective. 
A better  solution would  be  to stipulate  in  the  new  Agreement  that  from  the 
third  year  of  its application  the  Commission  can  propose  a  new  five-year 
framework. ANNEX 
DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  FINANCIAl  PERSPECTIVE  FRAMEWORK  AND  OF  THE  BUDGET1 
I.  FINANCIAL  PERSPECTIVE  FRAMEWORK:  CHANGES  UADE 
1.  Financial  perspective  1988 
2.  Current  financial  perspective 
3.  Macroeconomic  figures  and  forecasts  used  for  the  technical  adjustments 
of  the  financial  perspective  (point  9) 
4.  Adjustments of  the  financial  perspective  in  I ine  with  the  conditions 
of  implementation  (points  10  and  11) 
5.  Revisions  and  amendments  of  the  financial  perspective 
6.  Comparison  between  initial  and  current  financial  perspective 
7.  Margin  available  between ceiling  for  payment  appropriations  required 
in  financial  perspective and  own  resources  cei I ing 
8.  Breakdown  by  financial  perspective  heading 
II.  DEVELOPMENT  OF  COMMUNITY  BUDGET  WITHIN  FINANCIAL  PERSPECTIVE  FRAMEWORK 
1.  Community  budget  1980-92 
Commitment  and  payment  appropriations.  ECU  bi I I ion,  1980  prices 
2.  Community  budget  1980-92 
Total  expenditure  (payment  appropriations)  as  %of  GNP 
3.  Total  commitment  appropriations  (current  prices)  in  relation  to 
financial  perspective 
4.  Total  payment  appropriations  (%of  GNP)  in  relation  to own  resources 
eel I ing 
5.  Commitment  appropriations  (current  prices)  in  relation  to cei I ings  for 
individual  headings of  financial  perspective 
The  aetual  framework  of  the  financial  perspective  is  the one  in  forco  in 
Feourary  1992  after the  >avision. I-1 
FIJIAHCIAL  PERSP.x:TM 
(  ECU  llillion at  1988  prices) 
Appropriations  for  collllitlents 
1988  1989  1990  1991  1992 
1.  EAGGF  Guarantee  27500  27700  28400  29000  29600 
2.  Structural operations  7790  9200  10600  12100  13450 
3.  Policies vitb 11ultiannual  allocations  (1)  1210  1650  1900  2150  2400 
4.  other policies  2103  2385  2500  2700  2800 
of  which  : non  compulsory  1646  1801  1860  1910  1970 
5.  Repa~ents and  adllinistration  5700  4950  4500  4000  3550 
of  ·  ch : stock disposal  1240  HOD  HOD  HOO  1400 
6.  Konetary reserve  (  2)  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000 
T 0 TAL  45303  46885  48900  50950  52800 
of  which :  (3) 
co~~pulsory  33698  32607  32810  32980  moo 
non  compulsory  11605  14278  16090  17970  19400 
Appropriations  for  payaents  required  43179  45300  46900  48600  50100 
of  which :  (3) 
33110  coupulsory  33640  32604  32740  32910 
non  co11pulsory  10139  12696  14160  15690  16990 
Appropriations  for  payaents required  as  t of  GNP  1.12  1.14  1.15  1.16  1.17 
llarqin for  unforeseen expenditure  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.03 
own  resources required as  t of  GNP  1.15  1.17  1.18  1.19  1.20 
(2)  Chapter F  on  budget  estimates of  tbe  European  Council  indicates a figure of  ECU  2400  D.i.llion  (1988  prices) 
for  policies vitb Jlultiannual  allocations  in  1992.  The  policies in question are research  and 
technological  development  and  inl:ei]rated Mediterranean progrmes.  Only  expenditure for  which a legal  basis 
exists  ~~ay be  financed  under  tbis  1  te~~.  The  present  fmework  prograJ!Jie  provides a legal basis 
for  research  expenditure of  ECU  863  million  (current prices)  for  1992.  '111e  regulation  on  integrated 
Mediterranean progrmes  provides a legal basis for  an  estimated  aJIOunt of  ECU  300  llillion  (current  prices)  in  1992. 
The  two am of  tbe  budgetary  authority  undertake  to respect the principle tbat further  budget  appropriations 
within this  ceiling for  1990,  1991  and  1992  will require a revision of  tbe existing fraJlework  progranne,  or, 
before  tbe  end of  1991,  a decision  on a new  franework  progrme based  on a proposal  fran  the  CO!Illlssion  in 
accordance vitb tbe  legislative provisions  in Aticle  130 Q  of tbe  European  Econonic  CollJIIlDity  Treaty. 
(3)  At current prices. 
(  4)  Based  on  the classification in  tbe  1989  prelWnary draft budget.  Modifications  resulting  from 
decisions  by  tbe  budgetary  authority  on  changes  of classification will  be  i.JipleJiellted  as a technical 
adjustenent,  according  to  point 9 ol  tbe  Interinstitutional Agreenent. r.Z 
FINANCIAL  PERSPECTIVE 
(ECU  million.  Current  prices) 
XIX/A/1  dn  Lotus\pf\pf. wk3  tabe  Appropriations  for  coni tments 
09-Mar-92  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992 
1.  EhGGF  Guarantee  (1)  27500  28613  30700  33000  35039 
2.  Structural  operations  7790  9522  11555  14804  18109 
3.  Policies  with  multiannual  allocations  (2)  1210  1708  2071  2466  2915 
4.  other  policies  (  1)  2103  2468  3229  5648  5636 
of  which  : non  compulsory  1646  1864  2523  4738  4704 
5.  Repa~ents and  administration  5700  5153  4930  4559  3893 
of w  ich  : stock  disposal  1240  1449  1523  1375  810 
6.  Monetary  reserve  (  3  )  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000 
T  0 TAL  45303  48464  53485  61477  66592 
of  which  :  (  4) 
compulsory  33698  33764  35454  37199  38260 
non  compulsory  11605  14700  18031  24278  28332 
Appropriations  for  payments  required  43779  46885  51291  58458  63241 
of  which  :  (  4) 
compulsory  33640  33745  35372  37195  38200 
non  compulsory  10139  13140  15919  21263  25041 
Appropriations  for  payments  required  as  % of  GNP  1.12  1.07  LOB  1.14  1.15 
(  1)  In  accordance  with  the  joint statement  made  by  the  three  institutions  when  the  revision  of  the  Financial 
Regulation  was  adopted  and  in  order  to  ensure  the  proper  financing  of  food  aid  without  having  to 
revise  the  financial  perspective,  compliance  with  the  ceilings  for  Items  1 and  4 will  not  rule  out 
the  possibility  of a transfer  between  the  headings  in  Chapter  81-33  (refunds  in connection  with 
Co1111unity  food  aid)  and  Chapter  B7-20  (food  aid)  . This  means  that  the  amounts  of  these  transfers 
will  not  counts  towards  the  totals  of  appropriations  to  be  taken  into consideration  for  the  purpose 
of  ensuring  compliance  with  the  ceilings  in  the  financial  perspective.  The  criteria  for  the  examination 
of  these  transfers  are  those  agreed  by  the  Council,  Parliament  and  the  Couission  in  their  statement 
of  12  February  1990. 
(2)  Chapter  F  on  budget  estimates  of  the  European  Council  indicates  a figure  of  ECU  2400  million  (1988  prices) 
for  policies  with  multiannual  allocations  in  1992.  The  policies  in  question  are  research  and 
technological  development  and  integrated Mediterranean  programmes.  Only  expenditure  for  which  a legal  basis 
exists  may  be  financed  under  this  1tem.  The  present  framework  prograllll1e  provides  a legal  basis 
for  research  expenditure  of  ECU  863  million  (current  prices)  for  1992.  The  regulation  on  integrated 
Mediterranean  programles  provides a legal  basis  for  an  estimated  amount  of  ECU  300  million  (current  prices)  in  1992. 
1'he  two  arms  of  the  budgetary  authority  undertake  to  respect  the  principle  that  further  budget  appropriations 
within  this  ceiling  for  1990,  1991  and  1992  will  require  a revision  of  the  existing  framework  program1e,  or, 
before  the  end  of  1991,  a decision  on  a new  framework  progrllllllle  based  on  a proposal  from  the  Corruussion  in 
accordance  with  the  legislative provisions  in  Aticle  130  Q  of  the  European  Economic  Co1111unity  Treaty. 
(  3)  At  current  prices. 
(  4)  Based  on  the  classification  in  the  1991  budget  and  the  1992  supplementary  and  amending  preliminary draft budget. I.3 
MACROECONOMIC  FIGURES  AND  FORECASTS  USED  FOR  THE  TECHNICAL  ADJUSTEMENTS 
OF  THE  FINANCIAL  PERSPECTIVE  (Point  9  of  the Interinstitutional Agreement) 
1989  1990  1991  1992 
Real  GNP  growth rate  (  % per year  ) 
Adjustment  for  1989  3.0 
II  II  1990  3.0  3.0 
II  II  1991  3.4  3.1  3.1 
II  II  1992  (excluding  former  GDR)  3.3  2.8  2.2  2.5 
(including former  GDR)  2.5 
GNP  deflator  (  % per year  ) 
Adjustment  for  1989  3.5 
II  II  1990  4.6  4.0 
II  II  1991  5.3  4.3  3.9 
II  II  1992  5.2  4.9  5.4  4.6 
GNP  (current prices)  according to figures 
and  forecasts  used for adjustment 
for  1992  (  ECU  billion  ) 
- Excluding  former  GDR  4372  4711  5074  5440 
- Including former  GDR  5163  5536 
GNP  (current prices)  according to figures 
and  forecasts available on  18.11.1991 
Including former  GDR  from  1991.  4399  4737  5123  5493 ---------------------------
I.4 
ADJUSTMENTS  OF  THE  FINANCIAL  PERSPECTIVE  IN  LINE  WITH  THE  CONDIT!ONS  OF 
IMPLEMENTATION  (  Points  10  and  11  of the Interinstitutional Agreement) 
--
Adjustment  ahead of  the  1990  1991  1992 
ECU  million  budgetary procedure  for 
Heading  2 
1990  24 
1991  157  250 
1992  350 
Total  24  157  600 
Heading  3 
1990  4 
1991  63  80 
1992  115 
Total  4  63  195 
Heading  4 
1990  9 
Total  9 
Commit.  TOTAL 
1990  37 
1991  220  330 
1992  465 
Total  37  220  795 
Paym.  TOTAL 
1990  19 
1991  466  758 
1992 
Total  19  466  758 
22. ----------------------------------------------------~-·--~·-~------
REVISION  AND  AMENDMENTS  OF  THE  FINANCIAL  PERSPECTIVE 
Commitment  appropriations,  ECU  million,  current prices  1.5 
1990  1991  1992 
1.  JUNE  1990 
Heading  2  Underestimation  inflation  90 
Heading  4  (1)500  1175  1628 
(non-comp.)  Central  and  Eastern  Europe  500  820  970 
Other external  policies 
and  internal policies  355  658 
Heading  5  -40  -150 
Stock disposal  Margin  available  -450 
Administration  Growth  adjustment  -40  300 
Commit.  TOTAL  500  1225  1478 
Paym.  TOTAL  500  1225  1478 
( 1)  Including  ECU  300  million in  December  1989  revisions decision 
at same  time as  adoption of  1990  budget. 
2.  DECEMBER  1990 
Heading  2  German  unification  750  1000 
Heading  3  Unused  margin  -50 
Heading  4  665  110 
Comp.  German  unification  10  10 
Non-comp.  German  unification  90  100 
Internal policies  35 
Gulf crisis  530 
Heading  5  0  0 
Stock disposal  Margin  available  -220  -40 
Repaym.Sp.Port  Reassessment  180 
Administration  Serman  unification  new  tasks  40  40 
Commit.  TOTAL  1365  1110 
Paym.  TOTAL  1085  910 
3.  MAY  1991 
Heading  4  728 
(non-comp.)  URSS.  Technical  assisance  400 
Israel and  occupied territories  88 
Kurdish  refugees  100 
Famine  in Africa  140 
Heading  5  0 
Stock disposal  Margin  available  -3 
Repaym.Sp.Port  Reassessment  3 
Commit.  TOTAL  720 
Paym.  TOTAL  423  180 
4.  FEBRUAR  1992 
Heading  2  Underestimation  inflation  100 
Heading  3  Research  :  carrying-over  1991  -200 
Heading  4  412 
Cornp.  Margin  available  -88 
Non-comp.  CIS  :  Technical assistance  450 
Tropical  forests  50 
Heading  5  -312 
Stock  disposal  Margin  available  -381 
Repaym.Sp.Port  Reassessment  30 
Administration  Commission  (  external obligations  40 
PAY./COM.TOTAL  0 
2.'3 I.6 
FINANCIAL  PERSPECTIVE 
( Initial framework  after technical  adjustment  in  line  with  conditions  of  implementation,  revision  ) 
( Commitment  appropriations,  ECU  million,  current prices  ) 
1988  1989  1990 
INIT.  ADJ.  REV.  NEW  INIT.  }.DJ.  REV.  NEW 
1-EAGGF  GUARANTEE  27500  28613  0  0  28613  30700  0  0  30700 
2-STRUCTURAL  OPERATIONS  7790  9522  0  0  9522  11531  24  0  11555 
3-POLICIES  WITH  HULTIANNUAL  ALLOCATIONS  1210  1708  0  0  1708  2067  4  0  2071 
4-0THER  POLICIES  2103  2468  0  0  2468  2720  9  500  3229 
of  which  :  non-comp.  1646  1864  0  0  1864  2023  0  500  2523 
5-REPAYHENTS  AND  ADMINISTRATION  5700  5153  . 0  0  5153  4930  0  0  4930 
of  which  : Stock disposal  1240  1449  0  0  1449  1523  0  0  1523 
6-HONETARY  RESERVE  1000  1000  0  0  1000  1000  0  0  1000 
COMMITMENT  APPROPRIATIONS  - TOTAL  45303  48464  0  0  48464  52948  37  500  53485 
PAYMENT  APPROPRIATIONS  - TOTAL  43820  46885  0  0  46885  50772  19  500  51291 
'---· 
1991  1992 
INIT.  ADJ.  REV.  NEW  INIT.  ADJ.  REV.  NEW 
-··--· 
1-EAGGF  GUARANTEE  33000  0  0  33000  35039  0  0  35039 
2-STRUCTURAL  OPERATIONS  13807  157  840  14804  16363  600  1146  18109 
3-POLICIES  WITH  HULTIANNUAL  ALLOCATIONS  2453  63  -50  2466  2920  195  -200  2915 
4-0THER  POLICIES  3080  0  2568  5648  3406  0  2230  5636 
of  which  :  non-comp.  2180  0  2558  4738  2397  0  2307  4704 
5-REPAYHENTS  }~D ADMINISTRATION  4599  0  -40  4559  4362  0  -469  3893 
of  which  : Stock  disposal  1598  0  -223  1375  1703  0  -893  810 
6-HONETARY  RESERVE  1000  0  0  1000  1000  0  0  1000 
---· 
COMMITMENT  APPROPRIATIONS  - TOTAL  57939  220  3318  61477  63090  795  2707  66592 
·-· 
PAYHF~T APPROPRIATIONS  - TOTAL  55259  466  2733  58458  59805  758  2678  63241 !.7 
MARGIN  AVAILABLE  BETWEEN  CEILING  FOR  PAYMENT  APPROPRIATIONS  REQUIRED 
IN  FINANCIAL  PERSPECTIVE  AND  OWN  RESOURCES  CEILING  (1) 
% or  ECU  mill1on  (Current prices) 
1988  1989  1990  1991  1992 
(2) 
1-0WN  RESOURCES  CEILING 
-ECU  Million  44952  51468  55897  60968  65916 
-%  of  GNP  1.15  1.17  1.18  1.19  1. 20 
2-PAYMENT  APPROPRIATIONS  REQUIRED 
ACCORDING  TO  INITIAL  FIN.PERSP.(3) 
-ECU  Million  43779  46885  50772  55259  59805 
-%  of  GNP  1.12  1.07  1. 08  1.08  1.09 
3-PAYMENT  APPROPRIATIONS  REQUIRED 
ACCORDING  TO  FINANCIAL  PERSPECTIVE 
AFTER  ADJUSTMENT  AND  REVISION 
-ECU  Million  43779  46885  51291  58458  63241 
-%  of  GNP  1.12  1.07  1.09  1.13  1.15 
4-MARGIN  (  1-2  ) 
-ECU  Million  1173  4583  5125  5709  6111 
-%  of  GNP  0.03  0.10  0.11  0.11  0.11 
5-MARGIN  (  1-3  ) 
'  -ECU  Million  1173  4583  4606  2510  2675 
-%  of  GNP  0.03  0.10  0.10  0.05  0.05 
(1)  1989  - 1992  :  On  the basis of the figures  and  forecasts  for  GNP 
in  money  terms  as  used since 18.11.1991. 
Including the  former  GDR  from  1991  onwards. 
(2) 
( 3) 
Initial financial  perspective. 
After technical adjustment. 
1.5 N 
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F I  N A N C I  A L  P  E R S  P  E C T I  V E 
Breakdown  by  Heading 
Commitment  appropriations  CECU  million,  current  prices) 
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